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Abstract
Private labels, also called store brands or distributor brands, have changed the retail industry during
the last three decades. Consumer data shows strong growth of private label market share, and in
countries like Germany or Spain, the penetration of private labels is above 30% of total retail sales.
This paper analyzes the channel dynamics in a category where a private label is introduced. We focus
on the impact of private labels on retail and wholesale equilibrium prices, as well as on the pro¯ts of
each ¯rm of the supply chain. While private label introduction helps the retailer reduce manufacturer
brand's prices, we ¯nd that it does not always improve the total pro¯ts of the supply chain. Generally,
the supply chain bene¯ts from this introduction only when cross-elasticities are small, i.e., competitive
interactions are weak. With our model, we formulate the general conditions under which retailers should
consider introducing private labels.
Keywords: Private label, non-cooperative game theory, supply chain e±ciency.
1 Introduction
Private labels are the products that are speci¯c to a retail chain and cannot be bought at
competing retailers. They are controlled by the retailer who has exclusive rights on them.
They are manufactured by the retail chain or a third-party manufacturer. This third-party
manufacturer can specialize in private labels, e.g., Cott of Canada in soft drinks; or produce
both manufacturer brands and private labels, e.g., Friesland-Campina of the Netherlands in
dairy products. Private labels in fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) have been around for
more than half a century (the German hard discounter Aldi has been selling them since 1948).
They were originally associated with low price and poor quality, but by the ¯rst decade of
the 21st century this image has changed completely: today some retail chains sell private label
products that are of equal or superior quality than well established brands and premium brands
(e.g., Tesco's Finest). This leads to new and more complex competitive dynamics in retail.
The current economic environment has a detrimental e®ect on the bottom line of retailers
- with the exception of discounters [24]. It has induced several retailers to increase the share
1Research supported in part by the international logistics research center (CIIL) and the sector p¶ ublico - sector privado
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1of private label products in their stores [25, 26, 27]. This is but the latest development in a
trend towards an increased share of private label in retail. Reports published by ACNielsen,
GfK and other market researchers indicate that private label brands outpaced manufacturer
brands (commonly known as brands) in more than half of the markets measured [1]. Total
sales of private label grocery products in Europe reached $250Bn in 2005 and the growth of
private label sales has been stronger than that of manufacturer brands. Due to all of the above,
companies producing manufacturer brands now see private labels as one of their most important
challenges: \a bigger problem for the global brands is that retailers are turning over more and
more shelf space to their own labels."[2]
Private labels allow retailers to o®er products in market niches not served by manufacturer
brands and are a tool to generate shopper loyalty. They o®er the additional bene¯t of very
low marketing and sales costs (e.g., no costly advertising campaigns or end-of-aisle displays),
resulting in a lower cost structure. Some private label products have a higher percentage pro¯t
margin (but lower absolute margin), while others o®er higher absolute pro¯t margin than
manufacturer brands to the retailer.
Aware of these and other bene¯ts, retailers are increasingly using private labels to gain
leverage in their relationships with manufacturer brands. The strategic interaction of private
labels with manufacturer brands has been studied in the academic literature: the general
conclusion from the research is that private labels reduce double marginalization in the prices
of the branded product. Double marginalization is a prevalent phenomenon in supply chain
management and has been studied since Spengler [22]. Essentially, it consists in having both the
manufacturer and the retailer capturing a pro¯t margin independently, without coordination,
which results in higher prices than what would be optimal for the entire supply chain. When
introducing a private label, the retailer de facto reduces the retail price of one of the products in
the category, which forces the manufacturer to respond by reducing its wholesale prices. This
in turn translates in a lower retail price of the manufacturer brand, which reduces the double
marginalization e®ect.
Interestingly, while most of the existing papers imply that this mitigation of double marginal-
ization is bene¯cial for the supply chain, it turns out that this might not always be so. In this
paper, we explore the e®ect of private label introduction on supply chain e±ciency. This is
novel to the literature, that has mostly examined the impact of private labels on retailers and
manufacturers, separately. We propose a simple model for the analysis of the competitive dy-
namics between one retailer and several manufacturers when one of the manufacturer brands
is replaced by a private label. We model demand of each product (manufacturer brand or
private label) as a function of its price and the price gap with other products, and analyze
2the equilibrium prices resulting in such system. We ¯nd that the retailer is always better o®
introducing the private label, manufacturers always worse o®. Surprisingly, the total supply
chain pro¯t may be lower with the private label, speci¯cally when the substitution between
products is high. We show that our ¯ndings, obtained under a parsimonious model, are robust
to the modeling assumptions on the demand. We can thus use the insights of our model to
build recommendations on the use of private labels in retail chains.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review the related literature in x2. We
then present our basic game-theoretic model and discuss the impact of a private label in x3. x4
shows how to apply our model to more general assumptions on customer behavior (demand)
and the competitive setting (number of manufacturers in the category). We conclude the paper
with recommendations in x5.
2 Literature Review
There is a vast literature on private labels, mostly in the marketing and operations manage-
ment literature. Kumar and Steenkamp [12] provide a broad overview of the problems in the
¯eld. Most of the research focuses on understanding the impact of private label introduc-
tions on prices and market shares. It includes analytical models and empirical work. Jeuland
and Shugan [8] address the coordination problem in di®erentiated channels (supply chains).
McGuire and Staelin [15] present a model to analyze Nash equilibria in duopoly structures,
where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single and exclusive retailer. They
introduce a parameter for substitutability for the two end-products into the analysis and show
that product substitutability does in°uence the equilibrium distribution structure. Shugan and
Jeuland [20] build on the model presented in McGuire and Staelin [15] and present a basic
framework for analyzing competitive pricing behavior in distribution systems. The authors
model two manufacturers that sell through two di®erent outlets. They analyze several channel
con¯gurations and present the corresponding equilibria functions (vertical channel competing
with vertical channel; vertical channel competing with manufacturer Stackelberg, etc.). They
develop a set of tools to analyze channels of distribution and show that vertical systems (or coor-
dinated systems) may be more enduring than other channel arrangements. Building on Shugan
and Jeuland [20], Choi [4] presents a model that analyzes the price dynamics of two competing
manufacturer brand manufacturers that sell through a common retailer. He analyzes the dy-
namics of three di®erent non-cooperative games (retailer Stackelberg, manufacturer Stackelberg
and vertical Nash) both for linear and non-linear price-dependent demand. His ¯ndings are
supported by empirical evidence, with one exception: his model predicts increasing prices and
3pro¯ts as products become less di®erentiated. Raju et al. [18] provide an exhaustive analysis
of what makes a product category more conducive for private label introduction. They identify
that higher price competition between national brands and store brand as a key driver of store
brand introduction. Lee and Staelin [11] analyze vertical strategic interaction between channel
players and its e®ect on key channel pricing strategies. In their analysis, they employ several
families of demand functions and emphasize the need to be aware of the implications of as-
suming special form of the demand functions. They ¯nd situations in which a channel member
can be better o® by not using foresight of the other channel member's reaction if the latter
also has the ability and motivation to use foresight in making the pricing decision. Trivedi [23]
analyzes the e®ect of di®erent channel structures (integrated, decentralized and full distribution
channel) on pro¯ts and prices. In her analysis, she assumes a symmetric channel structure, i.e.,
both channels are either integrated, decentralized or full, but points out that future research
should consider asymmetric structures. Kurtulu» s and Toktay [13] analyze category manage-
ment practices, which can be thought of as a vertical integration between the retailer and one
manufacturer, and hence is similar to the use of private labels. While these papers focus on the
substitution aspect (both in products and stores) of competition and its impact on prices and
most use the basic linear duopoly demand function that captures product di®erentiation, we use
a similar model to analyze a di®erent type of relationship, i.e., the dynamics of a multi-brand
retailer with respect to independent manufacturers and one captive private label producer. We
also extend these models to more general demand structures and any number of players.
Another stream of literature deals with channel dynamics using Hotelling models, that are
used to model quality di®erentiation between products. Narasimhan and Wilcox [16] analyze a
retailer's strategic use of private label as a means of obtaining better terms of trade from national
brand manufacturers. More recently, Chen et al. [5] study the e®ect that developments costs
and di®erentiated marginal costs for retailers have on channel dynamics. Groznik and Heese
[6] analyze price commitment as a way for manufacturers to prevent store brand introduction.
They also consider store brand introduction dynamics with retail competition in [7]. In our
model we do not consider quality di®erences between products, and hence a Hotelling model is
not necessary (without quality di®erentiation, a Hotelling model induces a Bertrand equilibrium
where all market share goes to one ¯rm, most likely the private label manufacturer; this is in
stark contrast with reality).
The focus of our analysis, in contrast with earlier papers, is to understand the impact
of private label introduction on supply chain e±ciency, which is a missing element in the
literature. In this respect, our paper is close to the research on supply chain coordination.
Spengler [22] discusses how decentralized pricing decisions lead to loss of supply chain pro¯ts,
4the so-called double marginalization. Lariviere and Porteus [10] and Cachon and Lariviere [3]
show that double marginalization prevails even when retail prices are exogenous (in the sense
that the total quantity sold on the market is smaller than the optimal quantity) under demand
uncertainty. Perakis and Roels [17] provide bounds on the resulting ine±ciency. While most
of these papers focus on a single retailer single manufacturer setting, Mart¶ ³nez-de-Alb¶ eniz and
Roels [14] analyze double marginalization with multiple retailers and a shared, limited shelf
space.
3 Basic Model and Results
In this section, we present a basic model with one retailer and two products (supplied either
by two manufacturer brands or by one manufacturer brand and one private label), and linear
demand functions. We relax these assumptions in x4 to show the robustness of our ¯ndings.
3.1 Setting
Consider a retailer that sells two products in the same category. These two products are initially
supplied by two independent manufacturers. The retailer's objective is to evaluate whether to
replace one manufacturer brand by a private label that it directly controls. This is one of the
typical features of private labels: retailers indeed have full control over product design, manu-
facturing, logistics and merchandizing decisions. Usually, private label products are produced
by brand manufacturers, private label manufacturers or by vertically integrated retailers. A
brand manufacturer can decide to manufacture private label (e.g., Friesland-Campina, a Dutch
company, is organized in manufacturer brand and private label divisions) because it is being
forced by the retailer to do so, in order to improve its economies of scale, or to avoid its com-
petitor from producing private label. In the latter case it would be willing to supply the private
label at the competitor's cost or at variable cost, whichever is higher (assuming there is no price
dumping). Pure private label manufacturers (e.g., Cott Corporation, Canada) supply to one
or several retailers, each with his own private label. Finally, a manufacturer can be vertically
integrated with the retailer and produce its private label (one example would be Aldi Nord in
Germany, see Mitchell and Sachon [19]) or cooperate in a way that avoids the problem of dou-
ble marginalization (e.g., Mercadona and its \interproveedores" in Spain). In both instances
it is the purchasing power of the retailer that drives this cooperation. In what follows, we will
assume the latter to be the case.
The basic model thus includes two scenarios.
51. In the ¯rst scenario, denoted M+M, there are three di®erent parties in the supply chain,
manufacturer 1 (M1), manufacturer 2 (M2) and retailer (R). M1 and M2 produce their
products at costs c1;c2 and sell them to R at wholesale prices equal to w1;w2, respectively.
R then chooses retail prices p1;p2 for them. Of course, since they are independent, each
member tries to maximize its own pro¯t without cooperating with any of the other channel
members.
2. In the second scenario, denoted M+PL, there are only two di®erent entities, M1 and the
coalition of M2 and R. Indeed, if the retailer introduces a private label to replace the M2's
product, the transfer (wholesale) price of this product is now the true cost of the item,
i.e., w2 = c2. As a result, the retailer now maximizes the joint pro¯t of M2 and R. In fact
when setting wi = ci, the private label manufacturer makes zero pro¯t from selling the
item, and is instead compensated through a °at payment to cover its ¯xed costs plus a
negotiated ¯xed margin, usually small.
Figure 1 illustrates the two scenarios.
Figure 1: Two competing manufacturer brands (left, Choi [4]), manufacturer brand vs. private label
(right).
We analyze both scenarios using a non-cooperative game µ a la Stackelberg, where the man-
ufacturers are leaders or ¯rst-movers, and the retailer is follower or second-mover. One could
alternatively consider a di®erent sequence of events and the qualitative nature of the results
would not change.
The analysis of the ¯rst scenario M+M is similar to the manufacturer-Stackelberg model
in Choi [4]. In this setting, we capture the dynamics of product categories with two strong
brands, often the category leaders (e.g., Coca-Cola and Pepsi Cola in the soda industry). In this
game each brand manufacturer chooses its wholesale pricing wi based on the retailer's response
6function and conditioned on the observed wholesale price of the competitor's brand. The
retailer chooses the price of each product, p1;p2, so that it maximizes the total pro¯t obtained
from selling both types of products, given their respective wholesale prices. Manufacturers
(strong brands) control the market and know each other's wholesale prices. In this respect, we
characterize the Nash equilibrium of the game, where each manufacturer has no incentive to
unilaterally change its price given its competitor's price.
The analysis of the second scenario is M+PL is novel. The dynamics are similar as in the
previous case: the independent manufacturer now sets its price w1 taking into account that
the retailer will set p1;p2 higher or lower depending on w1. In comparison, the game in this
scenario is simply a sequential game where ¯rst the brand manufacturer sets its wholesale price
and then the retailer sets retail prices for both products.
3.2 Demand Model
The analysis of the competitive dynamics relies on how customer behavior is modeled. While
most of the product line design literature uses a Hotelling model to split the pool of customers
into the ones that prefer product 1 and the ones that prefer 2, this modeling approach is not
appropriate in our setting if we focus on products that are not di®erentiated in quality, see
Kumar and Steenkamp [12]. Indeed, when both products have the same quality, the Hotelling
model dictates that consumers, regardless of their valuation of quality, will all choose one
product or the other. This translates into having a demand function that is discontinuous on
the price of the item (essentially, demand is zero for the product with higher retail price), which
results in Bertrand competition, i.e., manufacturers setting wi = ci and making no pro¯t.
Since this approach does not match the empirical studies in retail, we choose to model
demand as a standard price-dependent function. Speci¯cally, we assume that the retail sales of
product i, denoted qi, depends both on its price pi, and its competitor's price p¡i. For simplicity,
we use a linear demand function, although we explore more general demand functions later.
While this might present technical problems (demand might become negative for some values
of pi;p¡i), it is widely used in the literature, e.g., Choi [4], Raju [18] or Kurtulu» s and Toktay
[13], and can be thought of the linearized version around equilibrium of any demand function.
As a result, we choose the parameters of the demand function so that all the quantities sold
are positive (i.e., ®, de¯ned below, is high enough).
We assume that for i = 1;2,
qi(p1;p2) = ® ¡ ¯pi ¡ µ(pi ¡ p¡i) (1)
7The demand function depends on three parameters. ® is the potential sales that each product i
can obtain when both products are distributed for free, and represents the scale of the market.
¯ captures the price elasticity of demand with respect to one's price, keeping the price gap
pi ¡ p¡i constant. We set ¯ > 0 in order to guarantee that when prices of both manufacturers
increase in the same amount, demand decreases. The cross-price elasticity µ > 0 represents the
substitutability between products: for the same price gap pi ¡ p¡i > 0 (< 0), the additional
demand that i can lose (gain) increases with higher µ. It is worth pointing out that setting
µ > 0 implies that the products are substitutes, which is exactly the type of strategic interaction
that we want to model, since they are in the same category. Also, we set the cross-elasticity
between both products to be identical, so that in a way the number of customers \leaving" M1
for M2, µ(p1 ¡p2) is equal to the number of customers switching to M2 from M1, ¡µ(p2 ¡p1).
In contrast, the standard price elasticity with respect to pi is ¯ + µ. Note that in order to
guarantee that the quantities are always positive, ® should be large compared to ¯;µ. Finally,
observe that these parameters are symmetric, which simpli¯es the exposition. It is possible to
consider ® and ¯ di®erent across products without a®ecting the results, see x4.1.
Having de¯ned the demand function, we can now de¯ne the manufacturers' pro¯t function
¦M1 = (w1 ¡ c1)q1 and ¦M2 = (w2 ¡ c2)q2 (2)
and the retailer's pro¯t function
¦R = (p1 ¡ w1)q1 + (p2 ¡ w2)q2 (3)
One can observe that these pro¯t functions are quadratic concave, which implies that it is pos-
sible to calculate analytically (1) the retailer's best-response strategy pBR
1 (w1;w2);pBR
2 (w1;w2)
to any w1;w2; (2) the best-response function wBR
i to the competitor's wholesale price w¡i, for



















2 ), the corresponding sales of each product, and the
pro¯ts of each ¯rm, for both scenarios M+M, M+PL.
We can thus compare the equilibrium values under both scenarios analytically, and describe
quantitatively the e®ect of a private label introduction.
3.3 Best-Response Functions for Retailer and Manufacturers
In order to characterize the equilibrium in each scenario, we ¯rst need to determine the best
response of the retailer when the manufacturers quote w1;w2. This best-response function is
valid for both scenarios, since the only change is that in M+M, w1;w2 are both selected by the

















Thus, as one would expect, the retail prices that the retailer sets are linearly increasing in
w1;w2, and do not depend on the substitution structure of the demand model. Indeed, since
the cross-elasticities for 1 and 2 are identical, one's retail price is only a function of the product's
wholesale price, and independent of the competitor's wholesale price.







® ¡ ¯wi ¡ µ(wi ¡ w¡i)
´
This allows us to derive the optimal best-response function of a manufacturer:
wBR
i (w¡i) = argmaxw1¦Mi(pBR
1 ;pBR
2 ;w1;w2)









Note that this wholesale price is always larger than ci whenever the quantity allocated to i
is positive (this is the case for ® large enough, as we assumed). Hence, one can see that
the wholesale price wBR
i quoted by a manufacturer is increasing in its own cost ci and most
importantly, increasing in the competitor's wholesale price w¡i, although any increase in w¡i
results in a smaller increase in wBR
i (less than half of it). This important feature implies that
the manufacturer pricing game must have an equilibrium, and that this equilibrium is unique.
3.4 The Competitive Impact of Introducing a Private Label
As mentioned above, the manufacturer pricing game can be solved explicitly in the M+M
scenario. The equilibrium is characterized by w1 = wBR
1 (w2) and w2 = wBR
2 (w1). Solving these















We thus we recover the results of Choi [4] Equation (2.8). Moreover, one can verify that when









Finally, note that wM+M
i ¸ ci in order to guarantee that demand for product i is non-negative.
9In contrast, under the M+PL scenario, the equilibrium is obtained by setting wM+PL
2 = c2











This inequality is true since wM+M
2 ¸ c2, wBR






1 (c2). As a result, we ¯nd that indeed the introduction of a private label
increases the price pressure on the ¯rst manufacturer, M1. Thus in equilibrium M1's wholesale
price is lower.
One of the central questions around the introduction of private labels is to determine whether
the retailer and/or the manufacturers are better o®. It turns out that M1 is worse o® after the
private label is introduced, and the coalition of M2 and the retailer is better o®. In the M+M
























































The pro¯t functions in (8) and (9) extend Choi [4] to allow asymmetric production costs
ci 6= cj of the two manufacturers. However, if we set ci = cj, we recover the results of Choi [4]
(in Choi's notation, we set ° := µ and b := ¯ + µ). In addition, we can calculate the supply
chain pro¯t as ¦SC := ¦M1 + ¦M2 + ¦R, hence
¦M+M
SC =
(¯ + µ)(3¯ + µ)














2¯(3¯2 + 6¯µ + 2µ2)
(3¯ + µ)(2¯ + 3µ)
ci +
¯µ(¯ + µ)
























10The corresponding pro¯t functions are ¦M+PL
M2 = 0 because the second manufacturer is now



































































We are now ready to compare the equilibrium prices, sales and pro¯ts on the two di®erent
scenarios, as shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 1. Wholesale and retail prices are lower in M+PL compared to M+M. In addition,













The proof of the proposition is straightforward. One can observe that indeed, with the
introduction of a private label by the retailer, manufacturer M1 reduces its wholesale price,





(2¯ + µ)(2¯ + 3µ)
· 0.
On the other hand, manufacturer M2 reduces its wholesale price to cost, as it becomes a
private label supplier. This results in higher sales of the private label product. The joint pro¯t
of M2 and the retailer is now larger, since more sales volume moves to the private label, on
which the retailer makes a higher margin.
We illustrate the change in the equilibrium values as a function of the cross-elasticity µ, for
the situation where both manufacturers exhibit the same production cost. As µ increases, the
intensity of competition increases since the same price gap between products results in higher
substitution of the more expensive product for the cheaper product. Intuitively, a very high
value of µ implies that the market is quite competitive, with low pro¯ts of the manufacturers
in scenario M+M. As a result, introducing a private label in this setting introduces minimal
changes the wholesale prices and quantities in equilibrium.
11One can see in the left part of Figure 2 that retail and wholesale prices in the M+M scenario
are identical and decrease. In the M+PL scenario, in contrast, the price of M1, wM+PL
1 is
smaller than wM+M
1 and also decreases with µ; the di®erence wM+M
1 ¡ wM+PL
1 gets reduced
with µ, since wM+M
2 approaches wM+PL
2 = c2. Similarly, qM+PL
1 is smaller than qM+M
1 but
the di®erence decreases with µ too. The right-hand side of Figure 2 shows the corresponding
pro¯ts. Indeed ¦M+PL
M1 < ¦M+M
M1 , but the gap of these two pro¯ts gets smaller with µ, since
as we pointed out above, both wholesale price and sales in the M+PL scenario approach the
values in the M+M scenario. In contrast, the joint pro¯ts of retailer and M2 increase under
the M+PL scenario, although again this increase is minimal when µ is large.




















































Figure 2: On the left-hand ¯gure, retail price and wholesale price both products, under M+M and M+PL,
for di®erent values of µ; on the right-hand ¯gure, pro¯ts of M1 and the coalition M2 plus R, for di®erent
values of µ. We use ® = 50, ¯ = 3 and c1 = c2 = 1.
From the results above, we can highlight three main conclusions. First, the introduction
of a private label will change the pricing dynamics in the channel. Indeed, this is equivalent
to removing the double marginalization on the product, i.e., reducing the wholesale price w2
to the true cost c2. The strategic e®ect of this wholesale price reduction is a reduction of the
wholesale price of the other manufacturer. Second, the private label will capture higher sales
than before, through a larger demand due to lower retail price, but also through substitution
of the branded product of M1 with the private label. The ¯rst product thus will reduce its
sales. Third, the retailer is always better o® by joining forces with a manufacturer through the
introduction of a private label in terms of pro¯ts, which would explain why so many retailers
12are considering this type of action. In contrast, the other manufacturer in the category, M1,
obtains lower pro¯ts. These three conclusions are prevalent in the literature, see Raju et al.
[18] for instance.
3.5 Private Label and Supply Chain E±ciency
In the discussion above, we focused on the impact of a private label introduction on retailer and
manufacturers. While retailer and M2 are doing better with the private label, M1 is doing worse.
It is thus unclear whether the introduction of the private label is positive for the entire supply
chain. The e®ect on the supply chain is in fact quite important since this is what determines in
the long run the competitiveness of the players, which might be facing competition from other
chains with a di®erent private label strategy. As a result, guaranteeing that the private label
improves supply chain pro¯ts is necessary. We investigate this issue next.
To build some intuition, the combined pro¯t of manufacturers and retailer will always be
smaller than that of a centralized chain, which is called the ¯rst-best. It is achieved by setting
retail prices (p¤
1;p¤






= argmaxp1;p2(p1 ¡ c1)q1(p1;p2) + (p2 ¡ c2)q2(p1;p2) = argmaxp1;p2¦R(p1;p2;c1;c2)
In other words, p¤
1 = pBR
1 (c1;c2) and p¤
2 = pBR
2 (c1;c2). The ¯rst-best supply chain pro¯t can












+ ¯µ(c1 ¡ c2)2
¸
(14)
Since in each scenario the equilibrium wholesale prices are higher than the cost, the equilib-
rium retail prices are higher than (p¤
1;p¤
2). As a result, sales are distorted as compared to the
¯rst-best:
² Total unit sales are lower than in the ¯rst-best;
² The mix of sales is di®erent compared to that of the ¯rst-best, i.e., each individual product
might sell more or less than in the ¯rst-best scenario.
These two e®ects create ine±ciency for the supply chain: double marginalization in a two-
product environment. Interestingly, the ¯rst e®ect (on total sales) is likely to be more important
in M+M compared to M+PL, because prices are lower in M+PL. On the other hand, the second
e®ect might actually be stronger in M+PL. Thus the overall e±ciency of the M+M and M+PL
equilibria will depend on the strength of this second e®ect. It ultimately depends on the price
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From these expressions, we observe that the price gap might indeed be higher under M+PL
compared to M+M. For example, when the two manufacturers are symmetric, in the M+M
equilibrium and in the ¯rst-best, the price gap is zero. In contrast, the price gap is positive
under M+PL equilibrium.
Since we have explicit expressions of ¦M+M
SC and ¦M+PL
SC , we can compare the e±ciency of
the two scenarios. ¦M+PL
SC ¡ ¦M+M
SC is an intricate function of the parameters. For simplicity,




(® ¡ c¯)2(4¯2 + 4¯µ ¡ µ2)
16(¯ + µ)(2¯ + µ)2 (15)
Under symmetric costs, Figure 3 illustrates the value of ¦M+M
SC and ¦M+PL
SC as a function of
the cross-elasticity µ. It is worth observing that ¦M+PL
SC > ¦M+M
SC if and only if µ is lower than
a certain threshold. This is intuitive: for low substitution levels, the scenario M+M results in
low e±ciency since the manufacturers quote prices that are too high, while the scenario M+PL
is e®ective in reducing M1's wholesale price and hence yields higher e±ciency. In fact, the
threshold can be explicitly calculated as stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 2. When c1 = c2, ¦M+PL
SC ¸ ¦M+M
SC if and only if µ · ¹ µ where
¹ µ = 2(1 +
p
2)¯: (16)
The threshold is found by setting the expression in (15) to zero. Figure 3 illustrates the
proposition. For the values used in the ¯gure, ¹ µ ¼ 14:5. The proposition implies that in product
categories with higher price elasticity ¯, there is a wider range of product substitutability for
which total supply chain pro¯t will be higher with a private label case than without it. These
results indicate that the retailer not only has a personal interest in introducing a private label
(because it improves its pro¯ts), but also has a very strong incentive to introduce a private
label into a product category with high price elasticity for the sake of supply chain e±ciency.
Finally, it is worth noting that a similar conclusion has been observed under di®erent settings,
when there is quality di®erentiation of private label and manufacturer brand and development
costs for the introduction of the private label, see Chen et al. [5].




















Figure 3: Total supply chain pro¯ts for the two scenarios, together with the ¯rst-best pro¯t ¦¤
SC. We use
® = 50, ¯ = 3 and c1 = c2 = 1.
More generally, when c1 6= c2, numerical simulations indicate that the same insight holds
true: it is bene¯cial for the supply chain to introduce a private label only when µ is lower than
a threshold. In that case, however, we have to bear in mind that the area for which sales are
positive (recall that ® must be large enough) imposes a constraint on the possible values that
µ can take. Speci¯cally, µ cannot be larger than a certain value µmax that depends on ®. 2
Thus, from our numerical experiments, we ¯nd a threshold ¹ µ · µmax such that for 0 · µ · ¹ µ,
¦M+PL
SC ¸ ¦M+M
SC , while ¦M+PL
SC · ¦M+M
SC for ¹ µ · µ · µmax.
4 Application to More General Settings
4.1 General Demand Models
The demand in x3 was speci¯ed as a linear function, for two reasons: ¯rst, it allows an an-
alytical study of equilibrium prices, quantities and pro¯ts, which generates insights; second,
it approximates locally real demands, which implies that the conclusions reached above apply
provided that the approximation is accurate in the vicinity of both the M+M and M+PL equi-
libria. In this section, we generalize the demand model and characterize the conditions under
which the results of x3 continue to apply. Note that the analysis of general demand functions
2µmax is the solution of q
M+PL




> 0. If c1 < c2, it is the positive solution of (2¯ + 3µ)® ¡ (2¯
2 + 4¯µ + µ
2)c2 + µ(¯ + µ)c1 = 0.
15in a duopoly quickly becomes intractable, as pointed out by Choi [4]. Because of this, we focus
on identifying the structural conditions that preserve the problem's structure.
For this purpose, we consider a general demand structure qi(p1;p2) that replaces Equation
(1). In order to simplify the exposition for this general case, we transform this price-dependent
demand into a quantity-depend retail price, denoted ri, i = 1;2:




= pi for all pi;p¡i
(17)
Following Singh and Vives [21], if the two products are substitutes (the cross-price-elasticity
is positive), then ri is decreasing in q1 and q2 (the cross-quantity elasticity is negative). For











The retailer's pro¯t can be written as ¦R(q1;q2;w1;w2) = (r1(q1;q2)¡w1)q1+(r2(q1;q2)¡w2)q2.
In order to preserve the structure of the analysis, we need ¯rst to guarantee that the retailer's





















































i.e., the retailer's pro¯t Hessian matrix is negative semi-de¯nite. If this is not satis¯ed, then
the best-response retail prices might be discontinuous in the wholesale prices, which does not
guarantee existence of the manufacturer's price equilibrium. Fortunately, the condition is satis-
¯ed in most common situations, for example when ri is jointly concave in (q1;q2) in the region

















, i.e., cross-quantity elasticities are not
too large.
Under these circumstances, we can de¯ne the retailer's sales allocation qBR
1 ;qBR
2 as a function




























´ ¸ 0: (19)
16Each manufacturer now faces the problem of maximizing (wi¡ci)qBR
i . This is well-behaved














and under this condition we can de¯ne uniquely wBR
i (w¡i), which is continuous function. In







which is true in the linear demand case.
Under the three conditions of Equations (18), (20) and (21), the introduction of the private
label always reduces the equilibrium wholesale price of M1, since wBR
1 (w2) is increasing and
wM+M
2 ¸ c2 = wM+PL
2 .












q1 + (r2 ¡ w2)q2
o
,





























The impact of a private label introduction on supply chain pro¯t is more di±cult to evaluate.

















When the ¯rst term in this expression is large,
@¦SC
@w2
> 0, and hence ¦M+PL
SC = ¦SC(c2) ·
¦M+M
SC = ¦SC(wM+M
2 ). This occurs when the cross-elasticity is large, see Equation (19). In
this respect, the result of Proposition 2 is qualitatively preserved under the general demand
model: the supply chain will bene¯t from the introduction of the private label only when the
quantity cross-elasticity is small, i.e., when the products are weak substitutes.
174.2 Categories with more than Two Products
Another simpli¯cation that was made in the model for the sake of tractability was to consider
only two manufacturers. In this section, we relax this assumption to have n products. The
M+M scenario thus extends to the price equilibrium of n manufacturers, while the M+PL
scenario becomes the price equilibrium between n¡1 manufacturers and one private label sold
at cost (for consistency, the brand replaced by the private label is item n). We replace the
demand function of (1) by
qi(p1;:::;pn) = ® ¡ ¯pi ¡
X
j6=i
µ(pi ¡ pj) for i = 1;:::;n (22)
Note that in this demand function, product cross-elasticities are constant, as in the n-manufacturer
model of Raju et al. [18]. Again, to prevent negative sales, we assume that ® is large enough.








which is identical to Equation (4) due to the fact that the cross-elasticities are all identical.






























(¯ + (n ¡ 1)µ)(2¯ + nµ)
2¯ + (2n ¡ 1)µ
ci +
(¯ + (n ¡ 1)µ)µ















(¯ + (n ¡ 1)µ)(2¯ + (n + 1)µ)
2¯ + (2n ¡ 1)µ
ci +
(¯ + (n ¡ 1)µ)µ







18extends Equation (7). It is again simple to verify that ci · wM+PL
i · wM+M
i , although
the decrease in equilibrium prices becomes smaller as n increases. This is intuitive because
with a larger n, the price competition inside the category is stronger to start with, and hence
introducing a private label only adds little additional competition.
It is interesting to understand the e®ect of the number of products in the category on
equilibrium prices, quantities and pro¯ts. Figure 4 illustrates the variation of these quantities
as a function of n ¸ 2. One can indeed observe that, as n increases, the category becomes more
competitive, i.e., prices converge to cost. At the same time, while the insights of Proposition 1
continue to apply, we observe that the bene¯ts of introducing the private label for the supply
chain become negative when n is large enough. This insight goes in the same direction of
Proposition 2: when competition in the category is strong enough without the private label
(either because there is strong substitution between items or there are many players competing),
introducing one distorts the competition, increases aggregate sales only marginally, but shifts
volume from the brands toward the lower-priced private label item so that total revenue might
decrease.















(n−1) ´ M+PL (brand)
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Figure 4: On the left-hand ¯gure, equilibrium wholesale price under nM and (n-1)M+PL; on the right-hand
¯gure, pro¯ts of M1 and the coalition M2 plus R. We plot these functions for di®erent values of n, the
number of products in the category. We use ® = 50, ¯ = 3, µ = 3 and ci = 1 for i = 1;:::;n.
195 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a simple model to evaluate the e®ect on supply chain per-
formance of a private label introduction, in one category. The analytical results derived with
game theory coincide with empirical evidence: the introduction of a private label product into
a product category forces the incumbent manufacturer brand to a strategic price reduction,
due to the price elasticity and cross-elasticities of the demand curves. This reduces the rents
realized by the manufacturer brand. The rate of price reduction of the manufacturer brand is
more pronounced when there is little substitution between the manufacturer brand and private
label product (i.e., a small µ). As product substitutability increases, the brand manufacturer
lowers its wholesale prices at a decreasing rate, to ¯nally approach the variable production cost
for large µ.
One of the main conclusions derived from our model is that the supply chain might be
worse o® after the retailer replaces one manufacturer brand by a private label. Indeed, while
introducing the private label reduces prices and the double marginalization e®ect on total sales,
it also distorts the price gap between the two items in the category, which might drive too many
sales to the private label, thereby reducing supply chain pro¯t. We found that the introduction
of private label is only bene¯cial for low values of product substitutability µ, and we identi¯ed
the threshold ¹ µ after which private label will hurt supply chain performance.
The basic model considers only two players and linear demand functions, but we extend
these insights to more general situations, see x4. In particular, we ¯nd that the introduction
of a private label generally reduces supply chain pro¯t when the competition in the category
is initially strong. This is the case when product substitution is high or the number of players
in the category is large. These extensions show that our conclusions are robust, and hence
constitute general recommendations for retail supply chains.
While our model adds to the growing literature of private labels in retail, it opens a number of
possible lines for future work. First, we identify the strategic impact of private label introduction
on category prices. However, there are other side e®ects that may be as important as prices:
shelf space allocations, product placement and promotional activities. These are short-term
decisions that manufacturers base on what competitors do, and are likely to be in°uenced
by the replacement of a brand manufacturer by a private label controlled by the retailer.
In this respect, continuous analytical models can shed light on how these operational and
marketing variables change with private labels. Second, the introduction of private labels is
usually followed by a rationalization of the category, i.e., the number of items in the assortment
is modi¯ed. It would be interesting to model the retailer's optimal assortment with and without
20private label to evaluate the changes for all players in the category and the supply chain.
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